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PROPERTY AND PRECISION

Margaret Jane Radin*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When I was a law student in the early 1970s, I needed a perspective on
property other than the one I got from my instructor, who, I used to say, would
call it a transaction cost if he tripped over a body in the gutter. In the library, I
found some of the early writings of Frank Michelman, and I became a lifelong
student and fan. When I was a young scholar that nobody had heard of, Frank
paid me the highest honor of taking my ideas seriously. I hope I can pass that on
with something approaching the generosity that he showed me. Except for a
recent casebook on Internet commerce,1 Frank is the only person, other than
students, with whom I have co-authored.' Take a look at the piece we co-wrote,
"Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice," and I challenge you to
pull apart our contributions, so cohesive was the process, and so serious was Frank
about integrating our ideas. So here I am, grateful and admiring, to try to say
something worthy of him.
I have chosen to focus on Michelman's unsung, or at least seriously
undersung, piece of property theory, published in the Nomos series in 1982,
entitled "Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property., 3 My motives for choosing
this piece are as follows. First, I know something about the topic, so maybe I can
say something worthwhile in a short space. The piece deserves more careful
treatment, though. With more time, I would have focused on its place within
Michelman's more general scholarship and the development of his thought over
time. He is the opposite of the kind of professor who has a template and runs
various subjects through it; rather, his perspective grows in power the more
subjects he tackles. On a still broader scale, it would be worthwhile to explore his
remarkable achievement in thinking through Rawls's theory of justice as it
* William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Sincere
thanks to Carl G. Anderson for able research assistance in readying this talk for publication, and to the
editors of the Tulsa Law Review for their patience and diligence.
1. See Margaret Jane Radin, John A. Rothchild & Gregory M. Silverman, Internet Commerce: The
Emerging Legal Framework (Found. Press 2002).
2. See Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatistand PoststructuralistCritical Legal
Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019 (1991).
3. Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: Ethics,
Economics, and the Law 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y.U. Press 1982)
(reprinted in 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 663 (2004)).
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implicates law. This is an important achievement, and I wish I had time to explore
it. And just for fun, Michelman's distinctive flair for writing could motivate a
study of the unmistakable "Michelmanic rhetoric." Here, I will have to settle for
quoting examples, allowing the flair to speak for itself.
A second reason for choosing "Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property"
is more personal. I too have published articles in relatively obscure venues that
sank beneath the scholarly waves too quickly, so I sympathize with the article's
state of being unsung, or at least seriously undersung. Moreover, I too had an
early article that was a big "hit" on the charts, with snippets making it into
casebooks, which only seemed to forestall anyone's reading later articles.4 So I am
acutely aware that everyone cites Michelman by reference to his early hit,
"Property, Utility, and Fairness," 5 to the neglect of equally important later work.
In my opinion, we have suffered the most from failing to give due attention to
"Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property," but, alas, there are other works
that have also not received the attention they deserve.6
My third reason for choosing this piece, and I expect that my audience will
find this the important reason, is that I think it's the best piece of property theory
of its generation, and maybe the best in the twentieth century, period. If
Michelman had the chutzpah of Kant, he could have called his essay
"Prolegomenon to all Future Study of Property Theory." In just thirty-four pages
(or forty with footnotes) it has the highest idea-to-word ratio of anything I have
ever read by a law professor. It is also the most impressive in terms of its
consistently precise and terse statement of ideas (at least among law professors).
Moreover, it is one of those rare works that can teach us how to think about its
topic (as I will try to explain). That is one of the reasons that scholars need to
read the work more carefully. Studying this article could save a whole generation
from re-inventing the wheel. It could save those of us who have absorbed
Michelman from gnashing our teeth when subsequent writers blithely assume a
tragic commons everywhere, or that more propertization is always better. In my
present field of intellectual property, there is far too much of that. If Michelman
were better understood, I think-or at least hope-that there would be much less.
II.

THE ARGUMENT

What Michelman sets out to convince us of in this article is that economic
arguments purporting to deduce, merely from the economist's core premise of
rational maximizing behavior, that private property is efficient are, and must be,
covertly smuggling in other premises; and that these other premises are necessarily
value-laden. The critical aim of the article is to get these hidden, value-laden
premises recognized and then to use them to critique real-world property regimes.

4. See Margaret Jane Radin, Propertyand Personhood,34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982).
5. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
6. E.g. Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72
Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987).
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I promised some highlights of Michelmanic rhetoric, so permit me to jump to
the conclusion and quote two sentences.
Suppose, for example, you think that the efficiency of private property is rooted in a
species-characteristic need or craving for privacy and security of person, or for the
experience of self-command over personal labor and product. Then if you observed
a society in which measurable numbers of persons were selling rights over their
bodies in exchange for the means of subsistence, or could live only by submitting to
the productive
direction of others, you would have to see that situation as
7
problematic.
The particular Michelmanic touch is getting the entire giant elephant of
wage labor wedged in between a couple of commas-"or could live only by
submitting to the productive direction of others" 8-that is the kind of detail worth
savoring.
Let me outline the analytical agenda that is accomplished so neatly in those
thirty-four pages.
At almost every step, Michelman makes a significant
contribution to property theory.
A.

Define What It Means to Have a PrivateProperty Regime

This topic alone captures a significant intellectual achievement. The article
sets out an institutional paradigm for private property that is, in my view, the best
of a long list in the literature. 9 It begins with the insight that a private property
regime must include coordination rules and principles. ° In particular, Michelman
points out that there must be rules for composition, decomposition, and
recomposition of the objects that count as property, and that these rules are
subject to limits. He gives us the memorable example of the checkerboard field
divided into one-centimeter squares," and demonstrates why that would not work
as a possible property arrangement. And who could fail to appreciate the nonexclusive Monday-Friday checkerboard skeet shooting easement example? 2 In
this stage, the argument explains to us that no matter how enthusiastically private
property is embraced, there must be some rational selection of principles about
coordination, about how property can be composed and decomposed.
Next, we must consider to what extent the regime will promote units of
property that lend themselves to internalization of costs and benefits to an owner,
versus units that lend themselves to "non-intervention," or what I would call full
alienability. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, without the benefit of Michelman's
thought on these topics, I was engaged in a prolonged debate with Richard
Epstein which, it turned out, was not so much a debate as two ships passing in the

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Michelman, supra n. 3, at 33.
Id.
See id. at 4-5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
See Michelman, supra n. 3, at 16-17.
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night.1 3 Epstein wanted to force the point that, as a full owner of a piece of
property, one could create any kind of complex detailed condition on alienation.
If one so desired, he should be able to arrange that, on condition that someone
didn't marry so-and-so from the law school, the property would pass to the
spouse's third relative, and so on. My point was that if we allowed such
unrestrained complexities, we would destroy the freedom of our successors. So I
tried to frame the debate as one about freedom now versus freedom later-for
example, by accusing Epstein of advocating the "apres moi le deluge" position.
But from the perspective of Michelman, I was talking about the importance of
internalization principles, which regulate alienation as time goes on, while Epstein
was talking about non-intervention principles, which he saw as necessary to
preserve liberty now. Michelman saw the inevitability of tension between these
and he carefully characterized the possible strategies to
two kinds of principles,
14
them.
reconcile
Another point to Michelman's credit is that he foresaw the possibility of
devolution over time of such principles-a topic that is in fashion today, but with
which he was concerned twenty-five years ago. He saw that over time, people
living under such principles would likely distort them from their idealized form.15
Therefore, we face the challenge that if we are to maintain in practice the mix of
principles we have chosen, we must develop some way to pre-commit to the
pattern chosen, or perhaps to pre-commit to stopping and fixing things at the level
of principle from time to time.
B.

Define the Presumptive Efficiency Thesis (PET)

The next step of Michelman's analytical procedure recognizes that if we are
going to have a serious argument over whether private property regimes are
presumptively efficient, we had better have a very precise definition of the thesis
at issue. So he defines, with great precision, what that thesis must say. 16 Included
in his definition is the critical point that the thesis must be a comparative one-if a
private property regime is to be called efficient, then it must be called efficient
compared to some other regime. Michelman's article goes into the details of how
to define something that is not a private property regime for this purpose. 7 While
I will not follow this point into the necessary detail, I do think it is underappreciated how important it is to define precisely what should count as an
alternative, and hence, what could even be argued to be presumptively
(comparatively) less efficient.

13.
Press
14.
15.
16.
17.

For an overview of the debate, see Margaret Jane Radin, ReinterpretingProperty 22-27 (U. Chi.
1993).
Michelman, supra n. 3, at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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Recognize That We Have DistributionConstraints and Rights Constraints
That Make Different Systems More or Less Tolerable

Michelman recognized that even if we try to use economic principles of
selection there are concerns about distribution and about rights that make specific
systems preferable for independent reasons.18 The key insight is that these must
be considered as prior constraints on utilitarian constructions of justification,
rather than just additional preferences to add to the utilitarian hopper. Thus,
there is a forced recognition that there are constraints that operate independently
of an economic choice between a private property regime and the non-privateproperty alternative.
D.

Now Ask Whether We Can Deduce That the Chosen Private Property Regime
Will Be Efficient Compared to Any Non-Private-PropertyRegime That Also
Satisfies Our Conditionson Distributionand on Rights

Having set up the question sufficiently to ask it with tolerable precision, the
next step is to ask it. Whether we consider the economic postulate that persons
are rational maximizers to be a factual premise about behavior or a theoretical
principle of reasoning, the question is whether we can deduce, from this postulate
alone, that the chosen private property regime will be comparatively efficient.
Whether we call it a factual behavior premise, or a theoretical principle of
reasoning, the conclusion must be that the chosen private property regime will be
comparatively efficient.
That conclusion apparently requires additional
9
premises.'
E.

ConditionallyAssert That Additional Premises Are Required

Of course, it is hard to prove the negative proposition that no additional
premises are required in addition to the supposed behavioral fact or supposed
theoretical imperative of economic rationality. As far as I know, no one has
seriously argued (rather than just tacitly assumed) that there are no necessary
additional premises; so, Michelman was right to turn to the question of what those
additional premises could be.
E

Describe the Premises That Are Likely Candidates to Be Smuggled into the
Argument

Michelman provides a list of six additional premises worth considering. 0
The identification of these tacit premises is a highly significant achievement. He is
gracious in that he doesn't provide examples of the people who have made these
assumptions without acknowledging them; rather, he has a point to make about
the nature of the claims in these premises. Here is a sample to give the flavor of

18. Id.
19. See Michelman, supra n. 3, at 21-22.
20. Id.
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these premises: that people prefer to be unmolested producers rather than
grabbers subject to grabbing by others, or recipients of others' sharing who must
also share with others; that people prefer the experience of private exchange
through markets to that of public decision through politics, and to that of
informal, extralegal cooperation; that a potential producer's uncertainty about the
extent of product that the producer will retain, after predation and/or forced
sharing, will have the result of less production, less valued goods, or wasteful
defensive measures; or that failure of coordination, through information failure
and strategies of freeloading and bluffing, will be lesser under a market process
than under a political process of collective decision or an extralegal process of
voluntary cooperation.
G.

Show That These Smuggled Premises Are Moral or Value-Laden

The problem Michelman identifies with these claims is that they are either
false or what he calls "quasi-empirical., 21 What Michelman means by this is that
their truth or falsity is unknown, and, although they could be factual, they are best
understood as propositions expressing the speaker's assumptions about the facts,
which assumptions are in turn best understood as moral propositions expressing
the speaker's view of how things ought to be.
The overarching point illuminated by the notion of "quasi-empiricism" is
analogous to the well-known utilitarian difficulty with the utility monster-once
we count people's preferences for experiences and social states of affairs, we can't
assume the utilitarian calculus will come out in the orderly Posnerian fashion.22
For example, it could be that some people really, really like using other people's
bodies. Thus, says Michelman:
One cannot just dismiss such preferences as "nonrational".... Of course, one
might discount them as morally unworthy [at the cost of moving the debate explicitly
to noneconomic moral grounds]. One can also try admitting that there may be some
people with the licentious preferences, but so few that their deviant wants are
plainly outweighed by those of the host of normal security-preferrers. Thus would
one enter upon quasi empiricism. Surely the crucial countings and "weighings" are
not empirically known or verifiable. Surely one's sense of conviction about them
arises from intellectual faculties hard to distinguish from those employed in moral
Surely their stuff is the stuff of Ought, though their
intuition and moral reason.
23
form be the form of Is.
I also recommend a similar, and similarly Michelmanic, passage on our
supposed inability to organize coordinated behavior if there are large numbers
who must agree, because we are naturally untrusting and uncooperative. This is
one of the most frequently smuggled premises in economic arguments about
property. It begs the question of how the property-protecting state can ever get

21. Id. at 21-22.
22. For a much more elaborate explanation, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are
Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711 (1980).
23. Michelman, supra n. 3, at 23-24.
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organized in the first place. Other people, starting at least with Hobbes, 4 have
noticed this move and exposed it, but I think Michelman provides the best
statement of it.
What is private property, regarded from the standpoint of economic policy, but a
particular form of regulation, a species of those "definite social arrangements...
that create coercion of some sort," institution of which is offered as the alternative
to tragedy? But then come the questions: Instituted (fashioned, decided upon) by
whom? Policed and enforced by whom? Obeyed by whom, and why? Because if
(and only if!) I don't obey, the constable will catch me, the prosecutor try me, the
magistrate convict me, the sheriff punish me? Who will make them? Where can the
regress end, if not in uncoerced cooperation, the untragic commons of constitutional
practice founded on a "rule" that there is no one to enforce but that people on the
whole adhere to, though adherence is in the interest of no one who does not5 trust
that (most) others will adhere to it ....In other words: no trust, no property.2
III. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
Let me now turn from discussion" of this article to the paths it paves for
future work. While some of this work has begun, there is much that remains.
First, Michelman's work highlights the phenomenon of feedback from
private property regimes into preference formation. The concluding paragraph of
the article encourages us to think more critically about regimes of private property
even if we come to believe some moral premise about the selfishness of persons:
[S]uppose, finally, that your commitment to private property was rooted in belief
that individuals do, as a matter of fact, usually exhibit prisoner rationality in their
encounters with one another. It is at least a possibility that you would, on further
reflection, think.., that the relation between the condition of trustlessness and
given institutions of private property might be not unidirectional but reciprocal-so
that not only is private property a prudent response to a given state of trustlessness,
but also particular private property arrangements sanction and reinforce
trustlessness.26
The phenomenon of feedback was not Michelman's primary focus of
attention in this article, yet he was clearly aware of its importance. The early
Marx said that "[pIrivate property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an
object is only ours when we have it ...

.,,27

If private property creates the

trustlessness that private property is supposed to cure, then private property has
no justification but itself, if we are sticking with economic reasoning. "Hell," as
Michelman himself might say, "private property might have created economic
reasoning too!"

24. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. 1, ch. XIV (Oxford U. Press 1958).
25. Michelman, supra n. 3, at 30-31 (quoting Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
Science 1243, 1247 (1968)) (footnotes omitted).
26. Id. at 34.
27. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early Writings 279, 351 (Rodney
Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Penguin Bks. 1975).
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Thus, we are faced with the question of whether our private property
regimes have made us too stupid and one-sided to prefer anything better. Or,
does there remain a stubborn impulse to non-commodification that will not give
up so easily? Although I have tried to address that question, I have so far not
been able to figure out whether it should be understood as an empirical question,
or if not, what kind of question it is. I think that critical theorists should still be
concerned with it. Commodification in the arena of information propertization is
a particularly salient current issue. For example, if semiotic theory shows the
should
permeation of all of our social world with the power of words and texts,
28
that serve to extend the propertization scheme of trademark ownership?
Another path for future work lies in the interplay of rights reasoning and
maximization reasoning that we see in this article. The article, even though it is
facially about economic rationales, does insist on the role of distribution-oriented
and rights-oriented commitments in constraining possible economic theories.29
Following this lead, one might well consider whether there are predictable
differences in the devolution rates of distribution principles and rights under
different regimes. I don't think there has been enough exploration down that
path. It is a species of non-ideal theory, and our political theorists have not been
as interested in non-ideal theory as I believe they should be.
In more general terms, a proper appreciation for the dynamic (and also nonideal) aspects of property is one of the strengths of the article that I advocate here.
Michelman's points about the phenomena of devolution of principles over time
and of feedback from the status quo regime into preference formation are
examples of the dynamic perspective. The current discussion of the possibility of
pre-commitment is one example where the dynamic perspective has been
influential, but surely there are many more paths to be taken.
Technological developments will continue to motivate the reconsideration of
how to arrange property schemes at a basic level, and attention to Michelman's
work on the characterization of a property regime should be most helpful in this
task. Here again, information propertization is an urgent item on the theoretical
agenda. I have in mind the likelihood that the Internet will require us to think in
new ways about the ease of spillover in property arrangements-about the
"permeability" or "adjacency" of property that, thanks to technology, is now
possible in cyberspace.
Moreover, we need to address the very important question about the optimal
scale of propertization; Michelman would consider this to be a part of the general
issue of internalization.30 Questions about optimal "package size" and the limits
of decomposition are latent within the example of the checkerboard ownership of
the field. In that example, if the field as a whole is taken as the resource, the
warning is that property could, in principle, be defined in packages that are of the

28. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (2004).
29. Michelman, supra n. 3, at 7.
30. See id. at 12.
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wrong size for anyone to use the resource efficiently." In a way, this is also a
question about defining what the resource is. To use one of my favorite examples
from a former student, Kevin E. Collins, it used to be unproblematic to assign
ownership of the airspace over a farm to the owner, but the advent of airplane
travel caused us to rethink the scale at which we defined ownership. This kind of
change continues to be forced on us as technology changes our use of resources
such as air and water. The Internet will surely provide us with more examples, as
we try to define the scale at which we should think of parts of the Internet as
resources or property-the individual computer, the local network, the backbone.
Finally, we need to investigate the dividing line between reasonable and
pathological commitments to private property. Consider what is now called
"system on a chip"-a semi-conductor chip with enough circuitry embedded in it
to run complex programs, such as the operating system for a hand-held device.
There are many patents and other forms of intellectual property protections
covering the features that one might want to put into a system on a chip. Should
we demand that the manufacturer of the chip obtain licenses from each of the
hundreds of different owners in order to create the product? The exclusive rights
of each of these owners will likely lead to unproductive fragmentation. Does that
mean that we are in need of a basic reconsideration of the present rules of
internalization, intervention, and recomposition? Doesn't the thicket of rights
lead to exactly the same problem as Michelman identified with collectivizationthat everyone's permission is needed as a condition of doing anything? If the
situation can be characterized partly as collectivization and partly as private
property, what respect is due to the "non-intervention" claims of the owners?
These questions straddle the divide between theory and practice. They are
good questions, and Michelman's work helps us to think about them clearly and
productively.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Michelman urges us to be critical. He urges us to question whether our
premises, once recognized as value-based, fit the institutions on the ground. This
is a wonderful pragmatist marriage of theory and practice, a much-needed focus
on non-ideal analysis of concepts and institutions. Far be it from me to point out a
nifty deconstruction, but it is, of course, also a dissolution of the fact/value
dichotomy.
There is a simpler lesson to learn as well: we should stop thinking that
private property regimes are always the best alternative to pursue, and that more
private property is always better. Even from within the narrow perspective of
economics these statements are false, due to administrative costs and deadweight
losses associated with monopolization. Michelman's work shows us how to
examine real world examples where the consequences of uncritical private

31. See id. at 8-17.
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property are not so mathematically obvious and to expose the value choices
behind the rationales used to support them.
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